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1 Introduction
The Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics — better known as the Many-
Worlds Theory — has had a rather uneven reception. Mainstream philosophers
have scarcely heard of it, save as science fiction. In philosophy of physics it is
well known but has historically been fairly widely rejected.1 Among physicists
(at least, among those concerned with the interpretation of quantum mechanics
in the first place), it is taken very seriously indeed, arguably tied for first place in
popularity with more traditional operationalist views of quantum mechanics.2
For this reason, my task in this chapter is twofold. Primarily I wish to pro-
vide a clear introduction to the Everett interpretation in its contemporary form;
in addition, though, I aim to give some insight into just why it is so popular
amongst physicists. For that reason, I begin in section 2 by briefly reprising
the measurement problem in a way that (I hope) gives some insight into just
why Everett’s idea, if workable, is so attractive. In section 3 I introduce that
idea, and state “the Everett interpretation” — which, I argue in that section,
is really just quantum mechanics itself understood in a conventionally realist
fashion. In sections 4–10 I explore the consequences of the Everett interpre-
tation via considerations of its two traditional difficulties: the “preferred basis
problem” (sections 4–6) and the “probability problem” (sections 8–10). I con-
clude (sections 11–12) with a brief introduction to other issues in the Everett
interpretation and with some further reading.
Little about the Everett interpretation is uncontroversial, but I deal with
the controversy rather unevenly. The concepts of decoherence theory, as I note
in sections 5–6, have significantly changed the debate about the preferred-basis
problem, but these insights have only entered philosophy of physics relatively
recently, and relatively little in the way of criticism of a decoherence-based ap-
proach to Everettian quantum mechanics has appeared as yet (recent exceptions
are Hawthorne (2010), Maudlin (2010) and Kent (2010)). By contrast (perhaps
because the salient issues are closer to mainstream topics in metaphysics and
1Arguably this has changed, but only in the last decade or so, and more so in the UK than
elsewhere. (Students occasionally ask me how the Everett interpretation is perceived outside
Oxford; my flippant answer is that there is a significant divide between philosophers who do
and do not take it seriously, and the divide is called the Atlantic Ocean.)
2This is largely anecdotal; see, however, Tegmark (1998).
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philosophy of science) the probability problem has been vigorously discussed in
the last decade. As such, my discussion of the former fairly uncritically lays out
what I see as the correct approach to the definition of the Everett intepretation
and to the preferred basis problem. Readers will, I suspect, be better served
by forming their own criticisms, and seeking them elsewhere, than by any im-
perfect attempt of mine to pre-empt criticisms. My discussion of the latter is
(somewhat) less opinionated and attempts to give an introduction to the shape
of the debate on probability.
I use little technical machinery, but I assume that the reader has at least
encountered quantum theory and the measurement problem, at about the level
of Albert (1992) or Penrose (1989, ch. 6).
2 The measurement problem
There are philosophical puzzles, perhaps, in how physical theories other than
quantum mechanics represent the world, but it is generally agreed that there is
no paradox. States of any such theory — be it Newtonian particle mechanics
or classical electrodynamics or general relativity — are mathematical objects of
some kind: perhaps functions from one space to another, perhaps 푁 -tuples of
points in a three-dimensional space, perhaps single points in a high-dimensional,
highly-structured space. And, insofar as the theory is correct in a given sit-
uation, these states represent the physical world, in the sense that different
mathematically-defined states correspond to different ways the world can be.3
There is space for debate as to the nature of this representation — is it directly
a relationship between mathematics and the world, or should it be understood
as proceeding via some linguistic description of the mathematics4 — but these
details cause no problems for the straightforward — naive, if you like — view
that a theory in physics is a description, or a representation, of the world.
Quantum mechanics, it is widely held, cannot be understood this way. To be
sure, it has a clean mathematical formalism — most commonly presented as the
evolution of a vector in a highly-structured, high-dimensional complex vector
space. To be sure, some of the states in that space seem at least structurally
suited to represent ordinary macroscopic systems: physicists, at least, seem re-
laxed about regarding so called “wave packet” states of macroscopic systems
as representing situations where those systems have conventional, classically-
describable characteristics. But central to quantum mechanics is the superposi-
tion principle, and it tells us (to borrow a famous example) that if 휒 is a state
representing my cat as alive, and 휙 is a state representing my cat as dead, then
3This simplifies slightly: it is frequently convenient — notably in cases involving symmetry
— to define the space of states so that the mathematics-to-physics relation is many-to-one, and
it is somewhat controversial in some such cases whether it is many-to-one (see, e. g. , Saunders
(2003) and references therein.) Such concerns are orthogonal to the quantum measurement
problem, though.
4That is: what is the correct view of scientific theories — semantic or syntactic. (cf
Ladyman and Ross (2007, pp. 111–118) and references therein).
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the “superposition state”
휓 = 훼휒+ 훽휙 (1)
is also a legitimate state of the system (where 훼 and 훽 are complex numbers
satisfying ∣훼∣2 + ∣훽∣2 = 1) — and what can it represent? A cat that is alive
and dead at the same time? An undead cat, in an indefinite state of aliveness?
These don’t seem coherent ways for the world to be; they certainly don’t seem
to be ways we observe the world to be.
Nor does the practice of physics seem to treat such states as representing
the state of the physical world. Confronted with a calculation that says that the
final state of a system after some process has occurred is some superposition like
휓, a theoretician instead declares that the state of the system after the process
cannot be known with certainty, but that it has probability ∣훼∣2 of being in the
macroscopic physical state corresponding to 휒, and probability ∣훽∣2 of being in
the macroscopic physical state corresponding to 휙. (If he is more cautious, he
may claim only that it has probabilities ∣훼∣2, ∣훽∣2 of being observed to be in those
macroscopic physical states.) That is, the theoretician treats the mathematical
state of the system less like the states of classical mechanics, more like those of
classical statistical mechanics, which represent not the way the world is but a
probability distribution over possible ways it might be.
But quantum mechanics cannot truly be understood that way either. The
most straightforward way to understand why is via quantum interference —
the 훼 and 훽 coefficients in 휓 can be real or imaginary or complex, positive
or negative or neither, and can reinforce and cancel out. Ordinary probability
doesn’t do that. Put more physically: if some particle is fired at a screen
containing two slots, and if conditional on it going through slot 1 it’s detected
by detector 퐴 half the time and detector 퐵 half the time, and if conditional on
it going through slot 2 it’s likewise detected by each detector half the time, then
we shouldn’t need to know how likely it is to go through slot 1 to predict that
it will have a 50% chance of being detected by 퐴 and a 50% chance of being
detected by 퐵. But a particle in an appropriately weighted superposition of
going through each slot can be 100% likely to be detected at 퐴, or 0% likely to
be, or anything in between.
So it seems that our standard approach to understanding the content of a
scientific theory fails in the quantum case. That in turn suggests a dilemma:
either that standard approach is wrong or incomplete, and we need to under-
stand quantum mechanics in a quite different way; or that approach is just fine,
but quantum mechanics itself is wrong or incomplete, and needs to be modified
or augmented. Call these strategies “change the philosophy” and “change the
physics”, respectively.
Famous examples of the change-the-philosophy strategy are the original
Copenhagen interpretation, as espoused by Niels Bohr, and its various more-or-
less operationalist descendents. Many physicists are attracted to this strategy:
they recognise the virtues of leaving quantum mechanics — a profoundly success-
ful scientific theory — unmodified at the mathematical level. Few philosophers
share the attraction: mostly they see the philosophical difficulties of the strat-
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egy as prohibitive. In particular, attempts to promote terms like “observer”
or “measurement” to some privileged position in the formulation of a scientific
theory are widely held to have proved untenable.
Famous examples of the change-the-physics strategy are de Broglie and
Bohm’s pilot-wave hidden variable theory, and Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber’s
dynamical-collapse theory (see the discussions in chapters X and X of the cur-
rent volume). Many philosophers are attracted to this strategy: they recognise
the virtue of holding on to our standard picture of scientific theories as repre-
sentations of an objective reality. Few physicists share the attraction: mostly
they see the scientific difficulties of the strategy as prohibitive. In particular,
the task of constructing alternative theories which can reproduce the empirical
successes not just of non-relativistic particle mechanics but of Lorentz-covariant
quantum field theory has proved extremely challenging.5
But for all that both strategies seem to have profound difficulties, it seems
nonetheless that one or other is unavoidable. For we have seen (haven’t we?)
that if neither the physics of quantum mechanics nor the standard philosophical
approach to a scientific theory is to modified, we do not end up with a theory
that makes any sense, far less one which makes correct empirical predictions.
3 Everett’s insight
It was Hugh Everett’s great insight to recognise that the apparent dilemma
is false — that, contra the arguments of section 2, we can after all interpret
the bare quantum formalism in a straightforwardly realist way, without either
changing our general conception of science, or modifying quantum mechanics.
How is this possible? Haven’t we just seen that the linearity of quantum me-
chanics commits us to macroscopic objects being in superpositions, in indefinite
states? Actually, no. We have indeed seen that states like 휓 — a superposition
of states representing macroscopically different objects — are generic in unitary
quantum mechanics, but it is actually a non sequitur to go from this to the
claim that macroscopic objects are in indefinite states.
An analogy may help here. In electromagnetism, a certain configuration of
the field — say, F1(푥, 푡) (here F is the electromagnetic 2-form) might represent
a pulse of ultraviolet light zipping between Earth and the Moon. Another
configuration, say F2(푥, 푡), might represent a different pulse of ultraviolet light
zipping between Venus and Mars. What then of the state of affairs represented
5In the case of dynamical collapse theories, Tumulka (2006) has produced a relativistically
covariant theory for non-interacting particles, but to my knowledge there is no dynamical
collapse theory empirically equivalent to any relativistic theory with interactions. There has
been rather more progress in the case of hidden variable theories (perhaps unsurprisingly, as
these supplement but do not modify the already-known unitary dynamics); for three different
recent approaches see Du¨rr et al (2004, 2005) (hidden variables are particle positions), Struyve
and Westman (2006) (hidden variables are bosonic field strengths) and Colin (2003) and Colin
and Struyve (2007) (hidden variables are local fermion numbers). As far as I know no such
approach has yet been demonstrated to be empirically equivalent to the standard model to
the satisfaction of the wider physics community.
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by
F(푥, 푡) = 0.5F1(푥, 푡) + 0.5F2(푥, 푡)? (2)
What weird sort of thing is this? Must it not represent a pulse of ultraviolet
light that is in a superposition of travelling between Earth and Moon, and of
travelling between Mars and Venus? How can a single pulse of ultraviolet light be
in two places at once? Doesn’t the existence of superpositions of macroscopically
distinct light pulses mean that any attempt to give a realist interpretation of
classical electromagnetism is doomed?
Of course, this is nonsense. There is a perfectly prosaic description of F:
it does not describe a single ultraviolet pulse in a weird superposition, it just
describes two pulses, in different places. And this, in a nutshell, is what the
Everett interpretation claims about macroscopic quantum superpositions: they
are just states of the world in which more than one macroscopically definite thing
is happening at once. Macroscopic superpositions do not describe indefiniteness,
they describe multiplicity.
The standard terminology of quantum mechanics can be unhelpful here. It
is often tempting to say of a given macroscopic system — like a cat, say — that
its possible states are all the states in some “cat Hilbert space”, ℋcat. Some
states in ℋcat are “macroscopically definite” (states where the cat is alive or
dead, say); most are “macroscopically indefinite”. From this perspective, it is
a very small step to the incoherence of unitary quantum mechanics: quantum
mechanics predicts that cats often end up in macroscopically indefinite states;
even if it makes sense to imagine a cat in a macroscopically indefinite state,
we’ve certainly never seen one in such a state; so quantum mechanics (taken
literally) makes claims about the world that are contradicted by observation.
From an Everettian perspective this is a badly misguided way of thinking
about quantum mechanics. This ℋcat is presumably (at least in the nonrel-
ativistic approximation) some sort of tensor product of the Hilbert spaces of
the electrons and atomic nuclei that make up the cat. Some states in this box
certainly look like they can represent live cats, or dead cats. Others look like
smallish dogs. Others look like the Mona Lisa. There is an awful lot that can
be made out of the atomic constituents of a cat, and all such things can be
represented by states in ℋcat, and so calling it a “cat Hilbert space” is very
misleading.
But if so, it is equally misleading to describe a macroscopically indefinite
state ofℋcat as representing (say) “a cat in a superposed state of being alive and
being dead”. It is far more accurate to say that such a state is a superposition
of a live cat and a dead cat.
One might still be tempted to object: very well, but we don’t observe the
universe as being in superpositions of containing live cats and containing dead
cats, any more than we observe cats as being in superpositions of alive and
dead. But it is not at all clear that we don’t observe the universe in such
superpositions. After all, cats are the sort of perfectly ordinary objects that
we seem to see around us all the time — a theory that claims that they are
normally in macroscopically indefinite states seems to make a nonsense of our
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everyday lives. But the universe is a very big place, as physics has continually
reminded us, and we inhabit only a very small part of it, and it will not do to
claim that it is just “obvious” that it is not in a superposition.
This becomes clearer when we consider what actually happens, dynamically,
to ℋcat, to its surroundings, and to those observing it, when it is prepared
in a superposition of a live-cat and a dead-cat state. In outline, the answer is
that the system’s surroundings will rapidly become entangled with it, so that
we do not just have a superposition of live and dead cat, but a superposition
of extended quasi-classical regions — “worlds”, if you like — some of which
contain live cats and some of which contain dead cats. If the correct way to
understand such superpositions is as some sort of multiplicity, then our failure
to observe that multiplicity is explained quite simply by the fact that we live in
one of the “worlds” and the other ones don’t interact with ours strongly enough
for us to detect them.
This, in short, is the Everett interpretation. It consists of two very different
parts: a contingent physical postulate, that the state of the Universe is faith-
fully represented by a unitarily evolving quantum state; and an a priori claim
about that quantum state, that if it is interpreted realistically it must be un-
derstood as describing a multiplicity of approximately classical, approximately
non-interacting regions which look very much like the “classical world”.
And this is all that the Everett interpretation consists of. There are no
additional physical postulates introduced to describe the division into “worlds”,
there is just unitary quantum mechanics. For this reason, it makes sense to
talk about the Everett interpretation, as it does not to talk about the hidden-
variables interpretation or the dynamical-collapse interpretation. The “Everett
interpretation of quantum mechanics” is just quantum mechanics itself, “inter-
preted” the same way we have always interpreted scientific theories in the past:
as modelling the world. Someone might be right or wrong about the Everett
interpretation — they might be right or wrong about whether it succeeds in
explaining the experimental results of quantum mechanics, or in describing our
world of macroscopically definite objects, or even in making sense — but there
cannot be multiple logically possible Everett interpretations any more than there
are multiple logically possible interpretations of molecular biology or classical
electrodynamics.6
This in turn makes the study of the Everett interpretation a rather tightly
constrained activity (a rare and welcome sight in philosophy!) For it is not
possible to solve problems with the Everett interpretation by changing the in-
terpretative rules or changing the physics: if there are problems with solving the
measurement problem Everett-style, they can be addressed only by hard study
— mathematical and conceptual — of the quantum theory we have.
6Perhaps in some sense there are multiple interpretations of classical electromagnetism:
perhaps realists could agree that the electromagnetic field is physically real but might disagree
about its nature. Some might think that it was a property of spacetime points; others might
regard it as an entity in its own right. I am deeply sceptical as to whether this really expresses
a distinction, but in any case, I take it this is not the problem that we have in mind when we
talk about the measurement problem.
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Two main problems of this kind have been identified:
1. the preferred basis problem (which might better be called the problem
of branching) — what actually justifies our interpretation of quantum
superpositions in terms of multiplicity?
2. The probability problem — how is the Everett interpretation, which treats
the Schro¨dinger equation as deterministic, to be reconciled with the prob-
abilistic nature of quantum theory?
My main task in the remainder of this chapter is to flesh out these problems
and the contemporary Everettian response to each.
4 The preferred basis problem
If the preferred basis problem is a question (“how can quantum superpositions
be understood as multiplicities?”) then there is a traditional answer, more
or less explicit in much criticism of the Everett interpretation (Barrett 1999;
Kent 1990; Butterfield 1996): they cannot. That is: it is no good just stating
that a state like (1) describes multiple worlds: the formalism must be explicitly
modified to incorporate them. Adrian Kent put it very clearly in an influential
criticism of Everett-type interpretations:
. . . one can perhaps intuitively view the corresponding components
[of the wave function] as describing a pair of independent worlds. But
this intuitive interpretation goes beyond what the axioms justify: the
axioms say nothing about the existence of multiple physical worlds
corresponding to wave function components. (Kent 1990)
This position dominated discussion of the Everett interpretation in the 1980s
and early 1990s: even advocates like Deutsch (1985) accepted the criticism and
rose to the challenge of providing such a modification.
Modificatory strategies can be divided into two categories. Many-exact-
worlds theories augment the quantum formalism by adding an ensemble of
‘worlds’ to the state vector. The ‘worlds’ are each represented by an element in
some particular choice of ‘world basis’ ∣휓푖(푡)⟩ at each time 푡: the proportion of
worlds in state ∣휓푖(푡)⟩ at time 푡 is ∣ ⟨Ψ(푡)∣휓푖(푡)⟩, where ∣Ψ(푡)⟩ is the (unitarily-
evolving) universal state. Our own world is just one element of this ensemble.
Examples of many-exact-worlds theories are given by the early Deutsch (1985,
1986), who tried to use the tensor-product structure of Hilbert space to define
the world basis7, and Barbour(1994, 1999), who chooses the position basis.
In Many-minds theories, by contrast, the multiplicity is to be understood as
illusory. A state like (1) really is indefinite, and when an observer looks at the
cat and thus enters an entangled state like
훼 ∣Live cat⟩⊗∣Observer sees live cat⟩+ 훽 ∣Dead cat⟩⊗∣Observer sees dead cat⟩
(3)
7A move criticised on technical grounds by Foster and Brown (1988).
7
then the observer too has an indefinite state. However: to each physical ob-
server is associated not one mental state, but an ensemble of them: each mental
state has a definite experience, and the proportion of mental states where the
observer sees the cat alive is ∣훼∣2. Effectively, this means that in place of a
global ‘world-defining basis’ (as in the many-exact-worlds theories) we have a
‘consciousness basis’ for each observer.8 When an observer’s state is an element
of the consciousness basis, all the minds associated with that observer have
the same experience and so we might as well say that the observer is having
that experience. But in all realistic situations the observer will be in some su-
perposition of consciousness-basis states, and the ensemble of minds associated
with that observer will be having a wide variety of distinct experiences. Exam-
ples of many-minds theories are Albert and Loewer (1988), Lockwood (1989,
1996), Page (1996) and Donald(1990, 1992, 2002). It can be helpful to see the
many-exact-worlds and many-minds approaches as embodying two horns of a
dilemma: either the many worlds really exist at a fundamental level (in which
case they had better be included in the formalism), or they do not (in which
case they need to be explained away as somehow illusory).
Both approaches have largely fallen from favour. Partly, this is on internal,
philosophical grounds. Many-minds theories, at least, are explicitly committed
to a rather unfashionable anti-functionalism — probably even some kind of
dualism — about the philosophy of mind, with the relation between mental and
physical states being postulated to fit the interests of quantum mechanics rather
than being deduced at the level of neuroscience or psychology. If it is just a
fundamental law that consciousness is associated with some given basis, clearly
there is no hope of a functional explanation of how consciousness emerges from
basic physics (and hence much, perhaps all, of modern AI, cognitive science
and neuroscience is a waste of time9). And on closer inspection, many-exact-
worlds theories seem to be committed to something as strong or stronger: if
“worlds” are to be the kind of thing we see around us, the kind of thing that
ordinary macroscopic objects inhabit, then the relation between those ordinary
macroscopic objects and the world will likewise have to be postulated rather
than derived.
But more importantly, both approaches undermine the basic motivation for
the Everett interpretation. For suppose that a wholly satisfactory Many-Exact-
Worlds or Many-Minds theory were to be developed, specifying an exact ‘pre-
ferred basis’ of worlds or minds. Nothing would then stop us from taking that
theory, discarding all but one of the worlds/minds10 and obtaining an equally
empirically effective theory without any of the ontological excess which makes
Everett-type interpretations so unappealing. Put another way: an Everett-type
8Given that an ‘observer’ is represented in the quantum theory by some Hilbert space
many of whose states are not conscious at all, and that conversely almost any sufficiently-
large agglomeration of matter can be formed into a human being, it would be more accurate
to say that we have a consciousness basis for all systems, but one with many elements which
correspond to no conscious experience at all.
9In fact many adherents of Many-Minds theories (e. g. , Lockwood and Donald) embrace
this conclusion, having been led to reject functionalism on independent grounds.
10It would actually be a case of discarding all but one set of minds — one for each observer.
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theory developed along the lines that I have sketched would really just be a
hidden-variables theory with the additional assumption that continuum many
non-interacting sets of hidden variables exist, each defining a different classical
world. (This point is made with some clarity by Bell (1981b) in his classic attack
on the Everett interpretation.)
At time of writing, almost no advocate of “the Many-Worlds Interpretation”
actually advocates anything like the Many-Exact-Worlds approach11 (Deutsch,
for instance, clearly abandoned it some years ago) and Many-Minds strategies
which elevate consciousness to a preferred role continue to find favour mostly in
the small group of philosophers of physics strongly committed for independent
reasons to a non-functionalist philosophy of mind. Advocates of the Everett
interpretation among physicists (almost exclusively) and philosophers (for the
most part) have returned to Everett’s original conception of the Everett in-
terpretation as a pure interpretation: something which emerges simply from a
realist attitude to the unitarily-evolving quantum state.
How is this possible? The crucial step occurred in physics: it was the devel-
opment of decoherence theory.
5 The role of decoherence
A detailed review of decoherence theory lies beyond the scope of this chapter,
but in essence, decoherence theory explores the dynamics of systems which are
coupled to some environment with a high number of degrees of freedom. In the
most common models of decoherence, the “system” is something like a massive
particle and the “environment” is an external environment like a gas or a heat
bath, but it is equally valid to take the “system” to be the macroscopic degrees
of freedom of some large system and to take the “environment” to be the residual
degrees of freedom of that same system. For instance, the large system might be
a solid body, in which case the “system” degrees of freedom would be its centre-
of-mass position and its orientation and its “environment” degrees of freedom
would be all the residual degrees of freedom of its constituents; or it might be a
fluid, in which case the “system” degrees of freedom might be the fluid density
and velocity averaged over regions a few microns across.
Whatever the system-environment split, “decoherence” refers to the ten-
dency of states of the system to become entangled with states of the environ-
ment. Typically no system state is entirely immune to such entanglement, but
certain states — normally the wave-packet states, which have fairly definite
positions and momentums — get entangled fairly slowly. Superpositions of
such states, on the other hand, get entangled with the environment extremely
quickly, for straightforward physical reasons: if, say, some stray photon in the
environment is on a path which will take it through point 푞, then its future evo-
lution will be very different according to whether or not there is a wave-packet
11Barbour (1999) might be an exception; so might Allori et al (2009), though it is unclear if
Allori et al are actually advocating the interpretation rather than using it to illustrate broader
metaphysical themes.
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localised at 푞. So if the system is in a superposition of being localised at 푞
and being localised somewhere else, pretty soon system-plus-environment will
be in a superposition of (system localised at 푞, photon scattered) and (system
localised somewhere else, photon not scattered). Intuitively, we can think of
this as the system being constantly measured by the environment, though this
“measurement” is just one more unitary quantum-mechanical process.
Mathematically, this looks something like the following. If ∣푞, 푝⟩ represents
a wave-packet state of our macroscopic system with position 푞 and momentum
푝, then an arbitrary non-entangled state of the system will have state∫
d푞 d푝훼(푞, 푝) ∣푞, 푝⟩ , (4)
so that if the environment state is initially ∣푒푛푣0⟩, the combined system-plus-
environment state is (∫
d푞 d푝훼(푞, 푝) ∣푞, 푝⟩
)
⊗ ∣푒푛푣0⟩ . (5)
But very rapidly (very rapidly, that is, compared to the typical timescales on
which the system evolves), this state evolves into something like∫
d푞 d푝훼(푞, 푝) ∣푞, 푝⟩ ⊗ ∣푒푛푣(푞, 푝)⟩ , (6)
where ⟨푒푛푣(푞, 푝)∣푒푛푣(푞′, 푝′)⟩ ≃ 0 unless 푞 ≃ 푞′ and 푝 ≃ 푝′. In this way, the
environment records the state of the system, and it does so quickly, repeatedly,
and effectively irreversibly (more accurately, it is reversible only in the sense
that other macroscopic-scale processes, like the melting of ice, are reversible).
Why does this matter? Because as long as the environment is constantly
recording the state of the system in the wavepacket basis, interference experi-
ments cannot be performed on the system: any attempt to create a superposition
of wavepacket states will rapidly be undone by decoherence. The overall quan-
tum system (that is, the system-plus-environment) remains in a superposition,
but this has no dynamical significance (and, in particular, cannot be empiri-
cally detected) without carrying out in-practice-impossible experiments on an
indefinitely large region of the universe in the system’s vicinity.
And this matters, in turn, because it is interference phenomena which allow
the different structures represented by a quantum state in a superposition from
interacting with one another, so as influence each other and even to cancel out. If
interference is suppressed with respect to a given basis, then evolving entangled
superpositions of elements of that basis can be regarded as instantiating mul-
tiple independently evolving, independently-existing structures. Applying the
analysis of emergence used in the previous section, we conclude that if macro-
scopic superpositions are decohered — as they inevitably will be — then such
superpositions really should be taken to represent multiple macroscopic states
of affairs.
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For this reason, by the mid 1990s decoherence was widely held in the physics
community to have solved the preferred basis problem, by providing a defini-
tion of Everett’s worlds. (It was just-as-widely held to have solved the mea-
surement problem entirely, independent of the Everett interpretation; since
decoherence does not actually remove macroscopic superpositions, though, it
was never clear how decoherence alone was supposed to help). Philosophers of
physics were rather more sceptical (Simon Saunders was a notable exception;
cf Saunders 1993, 1995), essentially because decoherence seems to fall foul of
Kent’s criticism: however suggestive it might be, it does not seem to succeed
in defining an ‘explicit, precise rule’ (Kent 1990) for what the worlds actually
are. For decoherence is by its nature an approximate process: the wave-packet
states that it picks out are approximately defined; the division between system
and environment cannot be taken as fundamental; interference processes may
be suppressed far below the limit of experimental detection but they never quite
vanish. The previous dilemma remains (it seems): either worlds are part of our
fundamental ontology (in which case decoherence, being merely a dynamical
process within unitary quantum mechanics, and an approximate one at that,
seems incapable of defining them), or they do not really exist (in which case
decoherence theory seems beside the point).
Outside philosophy of physics, though (notably in the philosophy of mind,
and in the philosophy of the special sciences more broadly) it has long been
recognised that this dilemma is mistaken, and that something need not be
fundamental to be real. In the last decade, this insight was carried over to
philosophy of physics.
6 Higher-order ontology and the role of struc-
ture
On even cursory examination, we find that science is replete with perfectly re-
spectable entities which are nowhere to be found in the underlying microphysics.
Douglas Hofstader and Daniel Dennett make this point very clearly:
Our world is filled with things that are neither mysterious and
ghostly nor simply constructed out of the building blocks of physics.
Do you believe in voices? How about haircuts? Are there such
things? What are they? What, in the language of the physiicist,
is a hole - not an exotic black hole, but just a hole in a piece of
cheese, for instance? Is it a physical thing? What is a symphony?
Where in space and time does “The Star-Spangled Banner” exist?
Is it nothing but some ink trails in the Library of Congress? Destroy
that paper and the anthem would still exist. Latin still exists but
it is no longer a living language. The language of the cavepeople
of France no longer exists at all. The game of bridge is less than
a hundred years old. What sort of a thing is it? It is not animal,
vegetable, or mineral.
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These things are not physical objects with mass, or a chemical com-
position, but they are not purely abstract objects either - objects
like the number pi, which is immutable and cannot be located in
space and time. These things have birthplaces and histories. They
can change, and things can happen to them. They can move about -
much the way a species, a disease, or an epidemic can. We must not
suppose that science teaches us that every thing anyone would want
to take seriously is identifiable as a collection of particles moving
about in space and time. Hofstadter and Dennett (1981, pp. 6–7)
The generic philosophy-of-science term for entities such as these is emergent :
they are not directly definable in the language of microphysics (try defining a
haircut within the Standard Model!) but that does not mean that they are
somehow independent of that underlying microphysics.
To look in more detail at a particularly vivid example, consider tigers, which
are (I take it!) unquestionably real, objective physical objects, even though the
Standard model contains quarks, electrons and the like, but no tigers. Instead,
tigers should be understood as patterns, or structures, within the states of that
microphysical theory.
To see how this works in practice, consider how we could go about studying,
say, tiger hunting patterns. In principle — and only in principle — the most
reliable way to make predictions about these would be in terms of atoms and
electrons, applying molecular dynamics directly to the swirl of molecules which
make up, say, the Kanha National Park (one of the sadly diminishing places
where Bengal tigers can be found). In practice, however (even ignoring the
measurement problem itself!) this is clearly insane: no remotely imaginable
computer would be able to solve the 1035 or so simultaneous dynamical equations
which would be needed to predict what the tigers would do.
Actually, the problem is even worse than this. For in a sense, we do have
a computer capable of telling us how the positions and momentums of all the
molecules in the Kanha National Park change over time. It is called the Kanha
National Park. (And it runs in real time!) Even if, per impossibile, we managed
to build a computer simulation of the Park accurate down to the last electron,
it would tell us no more than what the Park itself tells us. It would provide
no explanation of any of its complexity. (It would, of course, be a superb
vindication of our extant microphysics.)
If we want to understand the complex phenomena of the Park, and not just
reproduce them, a more effective strategy can be found by studying the struc-
tures observable at the multi-trillion-molecule level of description of this ‘swirl
of molecules’. At this level, we will observe robust — though not 100% reliable
— regularities, which will give us an alternative description of the tiger in a lan-
guage of cell membranes, organelles, and internal fluids. The principles by which
these interact will be deducible from the underlying microphysics (in principle
at least; in practice there are usually many gaps in our understanding), and
will involve various assumptions and approximations; hence very occasionally
they will be found to fail. Nonetheless, this slight riskiness in our description
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is overwhelmingly worthwhile given the enormous gain in usefulness of this new
description: the language of cell biology is both explanatorily far more powerful,
and practically far more useful, than the language of physics for describing tiger
behaviour.
Nonetheless it is still ludicrously hard work to study tigers in this way. To
reach a really practical level of description, we again look for patterns and
regularities, this time in the behaviour of the cells that make up individual
tigers (and other living creatures which interact with them). In doing so we will
reach yet another language, that of zoology and evolutionary adaptationism,
which describes the system in terms of tigers, deer, grass, camouflage and so on.
This language is, of course, the norm in studying tiger hunting patterns, and
another (in practice very modest) increase in the riskiness of our description is
happily accepted in exchange for another phenomenal rise in explanatory power
and practical utility.
The moral of the story is: there are structural facts about many microphys-
ical systems which, although perfectly real and objective (try telling a deer that
a nearby tiger is not objectively real) simply cannot be seen if we persist in
analysing those systems in purely microphysical terms. Zoology is of course
grounded in cell biology, and cell biology in molecular physics, but the entities
of zoology cannot be discarded in favour of the austere ontology of molecu-
lar physics alone. Rather, those entities are structures instantiated within the
molecular physics, and the task of almost all science is to study structures of
this kind.
Of which kind? (After all, “structure” and “pattern” are very broad terms:
almost any arrangement of atoms might be regarded as some sort of pattern.)
The tiger example suggests the following answer, which I have previously (Wal-
lace 2003a, p.93) called “Dennett’s criterion” in recognition of the very similar
view proposed by Daniel Dennett (1991):
Dennett’s criterion: A macro-object is a pattern, and the ex-
istence of a pattern as a real thing depends on the usefulness —
in particular, the explanatory power and predictive reliability — of
theories which admit that pattern in their ontology.
Nor is this account restricted to the relation between physics and the rest
of science: rather, it is ubiquitous within physics itself. Statistical mechanics
provides perhaps the most important example of this: the temperature of bulk
matter is an emergent property, salient because of its explanatory role in the
behaviour of that matter. (It is a common error in textbooks to suppose that
statistical-mechanical methods are used only because in practice we cannot cal-
culate what each atom is doing separately: even if we could do so, we would be
missing important, objective properties of the system in question if we abstained
from statistical-mechanical talk.) But it is somewhat unusual because (unlike
the case of the tiger) the principles underlying statistical-mechanical claims are
(relatively!) straightforwardly derivable from the underlying physics.
For an example from physics which is closer to the cases already discussed,
consider the case of quasi-particles in solid-state physics. As is well known,
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vibrations in a (quantum-mechanical) crystal, although they can in principle
be described entirely in terms of the individual crystal atoms and their quan-
tum entanglement with one another, are in practice overwhelmingly simpler to
describe in terms of ‘phonons’ — collective excitations of the crystal which be-
have like ‘real’ particles in most respects. And furthermore, this sort of thing
is completely ubiquitous in solid-state physics, with different sorts of excitation
described in terms of different sorts of “quasi-particle” — crystal vibrations are
described in terms of phonons; waves in the magnetisation direction of a fer-
romagnet are described in terms of magnons, collective waves in a plasma are
described in terms of plasmons, etc.12
Are quasi-particles real? They can be created and annihilated; they can
be scattered off one another; they can be detected (by, for instance, scattering
them off “real” particles like neutrons); sometimes we can even measure their
time of flight; they play a crucial part in solid-state explanations. We have no
more evidence than this that “real” particles exist, and indeed no more grip
than this on what makes a particle “real”, and so it seems absurd to deny that
quasi-particles exist — and yet, they consist only of a certain pattern within
the constituents of the solid-state system in question.
When exactly are quasi-particles present? The question has no precise an-
swer. It is essential in a quasi-particle formulation of a solid-state problem
that the quasi-particles decay only slowly relative to other relevant timescales
(such as their time of flight) and when this criterion (and similar ones) are met
then quasi-particles are definitely present. When the decay rate is much too
high, the quasi-particles decay too rapidly to behave in any ‘particulate’ way,
and the description becomes useless explanatorily; hence, we conclude that no
quasi-particles are present. It is clearly a mistake to ask exactly when the decay
time is short enough (2.54 × the interaction time?) for quasi-particles not to
be present, but the somewhat blurred boundary between states where quasi-
particles exist and states when they don’t should not undermine the status of
quasi-particles as real, any more than the absence of a precise boundary to a
mountain undermines the existence of mountains.
What has all this got to do with decoherence and Everett? Just this: that
the branches which appear in decoherence are precisely the kind of entities that
special sciences in general tell us to take seriously. They are emergent, robust
structures in the quantum state, and as such, we have (it seems) as much reason
to take them ontologically seriously as we do any other such structure in science
— such as those structures which we identify as chairs and tables, cats and dogs
and tigers. So — on pain of rejecting the coherence of the special sciences as a
whole — we should accept that unitary quantum mechanics is already a many-
worlds theory: not a many-exact-worlds theory in which the worlds are part of
the basic mathematical structure, but an emergent-worlds theory in which the
worlds are instantiated as higher-level structures within that basic structure.
12For an elementary introduction, see, e. g. , Kittel (1996); for a more systematic treatment
see, e. g. , Tsvelik (2003) or (old but classic) Abrikosov, Gorkov, and Dzyalohinski (1963).
14
In this sense, advocacy of the Everett interpretation has come full circle: the
rise and fall of many-exact-worlds and many-minds theories has returned us to
Everett’s original insight that unitary quantum mechanics should be understood
as, not modified to become, a many-worlds theory.
7 Aspects of the probability problem
Concerns about probability, and attempts to resolve concerns about probability,
have been part of the Everett interpretation since its inception, and the bulk
of philosophical work on the interpretation continues to focus on this issue, so
that I can do no more here than provide an introduction. I will do so by briefly
considering three questions which might be (and indeed have been) raised by
critics:
1. How can probability even make sense in the Everett interpretation, given
that it is deterministic and that all possible outcomes occur?
2. What justifies the actual form of the quantum probability rule in the
Everett interpretation?
3. How can the Everett interpretation make sense of the scientific process by
which quantum mechanics was experimentally tested?
Before doing so, however, I make two more general observations. Firstly,
if there is a problem of probability in the Everett interpretation then it is an
essentially philosophical problem. There is no mystery about how probabilistic
theories are mathematically represented in theoretical physics: they are repre-
sented by a space of states, a set of histories in that space of states (that is,
paths through, or ordered sequences of elements drawn from, that space), and a
probability measure over those histories (that is, a rule assigning a probability
to each subset of histories, consistent with the probability calculus). Given de-
coherence, quantum mechanics provides all three (at the emergent level where
branches can be defined) just fine, using the standard modulus-squared ampli-
tude rule to define the probability of each branch; indeed, historically much
of the motivation of the decoherence program was to ensure that the proba-
bility calculus was indeed satisfied by the modulus-squared amplitudes of the
branches. So a physicist who objected to the rather philosophical tenor of the
debates on probability in the Everett interpretation would be missing the point:
insofar as he is unconcerned with philosophical aspects of probability, he should
have no qualms about Everettian probability at all.
Secondly, it has frequently been the case that what appear to be philosoph-
ical problems with probability in Everettian quantum mechanics in fact turn
out to be philosophical problems with probability simpliciter. Probability poses
some very knotty philosophical issues, which often we forget just because we are
so used to the concept in practice; sometimes it takes an unfamiliar context to
remind us of how problematic it can be.
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Note that it is of no use for a critic to respond that all the same we have a
good practical grasp of probability in the non-Everettian context but that that
grasp does not extend to Everettian quantum physics. For that is exactly the
point at issue: the great majority, if not all, of the objective probabilities we
encounter in science and daily life ultimately have a quantum-mechanical origin,
so if the Everett interpretation is correct, then most of our practical experience
of probability is with Everett-type probability.
8 Probability, uncertainty and possibility
How can there be probabilities in the Everett interpretation (asks the critic):
there is nothing for them to be probabilities of ! Defenders will reply that
the probabilities are probabilities of branches (understood via decoherence),
but the objection is that somehow it is illegitimate to assign probabilities to
the branches, either because probabilities require uncertainty and it makes no
sense to be uncertain of which outcome will occur in a theory like Everett’s, or
because somehow probabilities quantify alternative possibilities and there are
no alternative possibilities in the Everett interpretation.
The conciliatory approach here would be to argue that these concepts do
after all find a home in Everettian quantum mechanics; that is, to argue that
people in an Everettian universe should indeed regard different branches as
different alternative possibilities, and be uncertain as to which one will actu-
ally occur. To my knowledge this was first argued for by Saunders (1998), via
an ingenious thought experiment related to traditional intuition pumps in the
philosophy of personal identity; Saunders’ goal was to make it intuitive that
someone in an Everettian universe should indeed be uncertain about their fu-
ture, even if they knew the relevant facts about the future branches (though see
Greaves (2004) for an attempted rebuttal). Subsequent work (much of it build-
ing on Saunders’) has tried to go beyond intuitive plausiblity and give a positive
account of what would ground uncertainty in the Everett interpretation.
I am aware of three broad strategies of this kind. Firstly, and most di-
rectly, Lev Vaidman points out (Vaidman 2002) that someone who carried out
a quantum measurement but did not observe the result would be in a state of
genuine (albeit indexical) uncertainty. (There would be multiple copies of the
experimenter, some in branches with one result and some in branches with an-
other, but each would be in subjectively identical states.) It is unclear whether
this notion of uncertainty (which does not appear to apply to pre-measurement
situations) is sufficient to assuage concerns.
An alternative approach via indexical uncertainty — this time also apply-
ing to the pre-measurement situation — is to think about branches as four-
dimensional rather than three-dimensional entities (thus entailing that branches
overlap in some some sense13 prior to whatever quantum event causes them to
13In exactly what sense is controversial, and the debate arguably overlaps(!) with oth-
ers in mainstream metaphysics; see Saunders (2010) and Wilson (2010a, 2010b) for further
discussion.
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diverge. Uncertainty is then to be understood as uncertainty as to which four-
dimensional branch an observer is part of. For exploration and defence of this
position, see Saunders and Wallace (2008a, 2008b), Saunders (2010) and Wil-
son (2010a, 2010b); for criticism, see Lewis (2007b) and Tappenden (2008).
The third strategy is closely related to the second, but takes its cue from se-
mantics rather than from metaphysics: namely, consider the way in which words
like ‘uncertainty’ would function in an Everettian universe (possibly given some
theory of semantic content along the ‘charity’ lines advocated by Lewis (1974),
Davidson (1973) and others) and argue that they would in fact function in
such a way as to make claims like ‘one or other outcome of the measurement
will occur, but not both’ actually turn out correct. I explore this idea in Wal-
lace (2005, 2006) and in chapter 7 of Wallace (2011); see also Ismael (2003) for
a position which combines aspects of the second and third strategies. Whether
such semantical considerations are metaphysically (let alone physically) relevant
depends on ones view of metaphysics; Albert (2010), for instance, argues that
they are irrelevant.
A conciliatory approach of a rather different kind is to concede that proba-
bility has no place in an Everettian world, and to show how one can do without
it; typically, this is done by arguing that human activity in general, and science
in particular, would proceed as if quantum-mechanical mod-squared amplitude
was probability, even if “really” it was not. Deutsch (1999) and Greaves (2004)
advocate positions of this kind; both regard ‘probability’ as something to be
understood decision-theoretically, via an agent’s actions. If it can be argued
that (rational) agents in an Everettian world would act as if each branch has a
certain probability, then (Deutsch and Greaves argue) this is sufficient.
Of course, there is also a decidedly non-conciliatory response available: just
to deny the claim that genuine probability requires either alternative probabil-
ities or any form of uncertainty. One seldom hears actual arguments for these
requirements; typically they are just stated as if they were obvious. And per-
haps they are intuitively obvious, but it’s not clear that this has any particular
bearing on anything. Someone who adopts the (hopelessly unmotivated) epis-
temological strategy of regarding intuitive obviousness as a guide to truth in
theoretical physics will presumably have given up on the Everett interpretation
long ago in any case.
This response is actually fairly close to Deutsch’s and Greaves’ position: if
it can be argued that mod-squared amplitude functions exactly like probability
but lacks certain standardly-required philosophical features that probability has,
it is open to us just to deny that those philosophical features are required, and
to adopt the position that insofar as mod-squared amplitude functions exactly
like probability, that’s all that’s required to establish that it is probability. This
is my own view on the problem14, developed in extenso in Wallace (2011).
14It represents a departure from my position in Wallace (2006).
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9 The quantitative problem
Grant, if only for the sake of argument, that it is somehow legitimate to at-
tach probabilities to branches. There is a further question: why should those
probabilities be required to equal those given by quantum mechanics?
One version of this objection — going right back to Graham (1973) — is
that the quantum probabilities cannot be the right probabilities, because the
right probabilities must give each branch equal probability. There is generally
no positive argument given for this claim, beyond some gesture to the effect
that the versions of me on the different branches are all “equally me”; still, it
has a strong intuitive plausibility.
It can, however, be swiftly dismissed. It’s possible to argue that the rule is
actually inconsistent when branching events at multiple times are considered,15
but more crucially, decoherence just does not license any notion of branch count.
It makes sense, in the presence of decoherence, to say that the quantum state
(or some part of it) branches into a part in which measurement outcome X
occurs and a part in which it does not occur, but it makes no sense at all to
say how many branches comprise the part in which X occurs. Study of a given
branch at a finer level of detail will inevitably show it to consist of many sub-
branches; eventually this will cease to be the case as decoherence ceases to be
applicable and interference between branches becomes non-negligable; but there
is no well-defined point at which this occurs and different levels of tolerance —
as well as small changes in other details of how we define ‘branch’ — lead to
wildly differing answers as to how many branches there are. Put plainly, “branch
number”, insofar as it is defined at all in a given decoherence formalism, is an
artefact of the details of that formalism. (And it is not by any means defined
in all such formalisms; many use a continuum framework in which the concept
makes no sense even inside the formalism. For more details on this and on the
general question of branch counting, see chapter 3 of Wallace (2011).)
So much for branch counting. The question remains: what positive justi-
fication can be given for identifying mod-squared amplitude with probability?
One might answer, as did Simon Saunders in the 1990s (Saunders 1995, 1997,
1998), by rejecting the idea that any “positive justification” is needed: after all,
in general we do not argue that the probabilities in a physical theory are what
they are (nor indeed, in general, that the other physical magnitudes in a theory
have the interpretation they have); we just postulate it. It’s not immediately
clear why this response is any less justified in the Everett interpretation than
in non-Everettian physics; indeed, arguably it works rather better as a postu-
late, since it is at least clear what categorical, previously-understood magnitude
is to be identified with probability. By contrast, in classical physics the only
real candidate seems to be long-run relative frequencies or some related con-
cept, and even establishing that those have the formal properties required of
probability has proven fraught. The most promising candidate so far is Lewis’s
“best systems analysis”(Lewis 1986, pp.,55,128–131) which constructs proba-
15See Wallace (2011) for details; I learned the argument from David Deutsch in conversation.
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bilities indirectly from relative frequencies and related categorical data; even
if that analysis succeeded fully, though, it would deliver no more than quan-
tum physics (together with decoherence) has already delivered, namely a set of
quantities with the right formal properties to be identified with probability but
no further justification for making such an identification.16
Papineau (1996, 2010) puts essentially the same point in a more pessimistic
way. He identifies two criteria which a theory of probability must satisfy: a
“decision-theoretic link” (why do we use probability as a guide to action?) and
an “inferential link” (why do we learn about probabilities from observed relative
frequencies?) and concedes that Everettian quantum mechanics has no good
explanation of why either is satisfied — but, he continues, neither does any
other physical theory, nor any other extant philosophical theory of probability.
The Everett interpretation (Papineau argues) therefore has no special problem
of probability.
In fact, in recent years the possibility has arisen that probability may actu-
ally be in better shape in Everettian quantum mechanics than in non-Everettian
physics. Arguments originally given by David Deutsch (1999) and developed in
Wallace (2003b, 2007) suggest that it may be possible to derive the quantum
probability rule from general principles of decision theory, together with the
mathematical structure of quantum mechanics shorn of its probabilistic inter-
pretation. A fully formalised version of this argument can be found in Wallace
(2010) and in chapters 5-6 of Wallace (2011).
In philosophical terms, what such arguments attempt to do is to show that
rational agents, cognizant of the facts about quantum mechanics and conditional
on believing those facts to be true, are required to treat mod-squared amplitude
operationally as probability. Specifically, they are required to use observed
relative frequencies as a guide to working out what the unknown mod-squared
amplitudes are (Papineau’s inferential link), and to use known mod-squared
amplitudes as a guide to action (his decision-theoretic link).17
Space does not permit detailed discussion of this approach to probability,
but at essence it relies on the symmetries of quantum mechanics. There is
a long tradition of deriving probability from considerations of symmetry, but
in the classical case these approaches ultimately struggle with the fact that
something must break the symmetry, simply to explain why one outcome occurs
rather than another. This is, of course, not an issue for Everettian quantum
mechanics! From this perspective, the role of decision theory is less central in the
arguments than it might appear: its main function is to justify the applicability
of probabilistic concepts to Everettian branches at all. (And conversely, if one
16For reasons of space I omit detailed discussion of the parallel tradition in Everettian
quantum mechanics of identifying probability via long-run relative frequency (notably by
Everett himself (1957) and by Farhi, Goldstone and Guttman (1989). I discuss this program
in detail in chapter 4 of Wallace (2011); my conclusion is that it works about as well, or as
badly, as equivalent classical attempts, though there is no direct Everettian analogue to the
best-systems approach.
17A more precise way of stating both is that the program attempts to show that agents are
rationally required to act as if mod-squared amplitude played the objective-probability role
in David Lewis’s Principal Principle; cf Lewis (1980).
19
were concerned purely with the question of what the probabilities of each branch
were, and prepared to grant that branches did have probabilities and that they
satisfy normal synchronic and diachronic properties, it is possible to prove the
quantum probability rule without any mention of decision theory; cf Wallace
(2011, chapter 4).)
If this last approach to probability works (and fairly obviously, I believe it
does), it marks a rather remarkable shift in the debate; probability, far from
being something which makes the Everett interpretation unintelligible, becomes
something which can be understood in Everettian quantum mechanics in a way
which does not seem available otherwise. (See Saunders (2010) for further de-
velopment of this theme.) I feel obliged to note that it is highly controversial
whether the approach does indeed work; for recent criticism, see Albert (2010),
Price (2010), and other articles in Saunders et al (2010).
10 Epistemic puzzles
The rise of decision-theoretic approaches to Everettian probability (whether to
make sense of probability or to derive the probability rule) has led to a new
worry about probability in the Everett interpretation. Suppose for the sake of
argument that it really can be shown, or legitimately postulated, that someone
who accepts the Everett interpretation as correct should behave, at least for
all practical purposes, as if mod-squared amplitude were probability. What has
that to do with the question of why we should believe the Everett interpretation
in the first place? Put another way, how would it license us to interpret the usual
evidence for quantum mechanics as evidence for Everettian quantum mechanics?
This suggests a division of the probability problem into practical and epis-
temic problems (Greaves 2007a), where the former concerns how rational agents
should act given that Everettian quantum theory is correct, and the latter con-
cerns how evidence bears on the truth of quantum theory in the first place, given
that it is to be interpreted a la Everett. Arguably, Deutsch’s decision-theoretic
program (and my development of it) speaks only to the practical problem; in-
deed, arguably most of the tradition in thinking about Everettian probability
speaks only to the practical problem.
The last decade has seen the development of a small, but complex, literature
on this subject. In essence, there are two strategies which have been developed
for solving the epistemic problem. The first is highly philosophical: if it can be
established that mod-squared amplitude is probability, then (it is claimed) no
more is required of the Everett interpretation than of any other physical theory
as regards showing why probability plugs into our epistemology in the way it
does. Strategies of this form rely on a mixture of solutions to the practical
problem (cf section 9), arguments that branching leads to genuine uncertainty
about the future and/or genuine probabilities (cf section 8), and appeal to the
no-double-standards principle I mentioned in section 7. The strategy is tacit in
Saunders (1998); I defended an explicit version in Wallace (2006) (and, in less
developed form, in Wallace (2002)); Wilson (2010b) defends a similar thesis.
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The other strategy is significantly more technical and formal: namely, con-
struct a formal decision-theoretic framework to model the epistemic situation of
agents who are unsure whether the Everett interpretation is correct, and show
that in that situation (perhaps contingent on a solution to the practical prob-
lem), agents regard ‘ordinary’ evidence as confirmatory of quantum mechanics
in a standard way, even when quantum mechanics is understood according to
the Everett interpretation. This strategy was pioneered by Greaves (2004) and
brought to a mature state in Greaves (2007a) and Greaves and Myrvold (2010).
The latter two papers, on slightly different starting assumptions (including in
both cases the Bayesian approach to statistical inference) take it as given that
conditional on the Everett interpretation being true, mod-squared amplitude
functions as probability in decision-making contexts, and derive that agents
will update their personal probability in quantum mechanics via standard up-
date procedures, whether or not quantum probabilities are to be understood
in Everettian terms. As such, these arguments take as input a solution to
the practical problem (whether postulated or derived via Deutsch’s and/or my
arguments) and give as output a solution to the epistemic problem. It is also
possible (cf Wallace 2011, chapter6) to combine the two strategies into one theo-
rem, which makes standard decision-theoretic assumptions and derives solutions
to the epistemic and practical problems in a unified fashion.
11 Other topics
While the bulk of contemporary work on the Everett interpretation has been
concerned with the preferred-basis and probability problems (and, more gener-
ally, has been concerned with whether the interpretation is viable, rather than
with its philosophical implications if viable), there are a goodly number of other
areas of interest within the Everett interpretation (or, as I would prefer to put it:
within quantum mechanics, once it is understood that it should be interpreted
Everett-style), and I briefly mention some of these here.
∙ If Everettian quantum mechanics is only emergently a theory of branch-
ing universes, what is its fundamental ontology, insofar as that question
has meaning? That is: what kind of physical entity is represented by the
quantum state? Of course, this question can be asked of any approach
to quantum theory which takes the state as representing something physi-
cally real, but it takes on a particular urgency in the Everett interpretation
given that the theory is supposed to be pure quantum mechanics, shorn
of any additional mathematical structure. For various approaches to the
problem, see Deutsch and Hayden (2000), Deutsch (2002), Wallace and
Timpson (2007, 2010), Maudlin (2010) (who argues that there is no co-
herent understanding of the Everett interpretation’s ontology), Hawthorne
(2010) (who is at least sympathetic to Maudlin), Allori et al. (2009), and
(in the general context of the ontology of the quantum state) Albert (1996)
and Lewis (2004b).
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(I should add one cautionary note: it is very common in the literature to
phrase the question as, what is the ontology of the wave-function? But
recall that the wavefunction is only one of a great many ways to represent
the quantum state , and one which is much more natural in nonrelativistic
physics than in quantum field theory.)
∙ It is generally (and in my view correctly) held that the experimental vio-
lation of Bell’s inequalities18 shows not just that hidden variable theories
must involve superluminal dynamics, but that any empirically adequate
theory must involve superluminal dynamics.19 But the Everett interpreta-
tion is generally (and again correctly, in my view) viewed as an exception,
essentially because it violates a tacit premise of Bell’s derivation, that only
one outcome actually occurs.20 There has, however, been rather little ex-
ploration of this issue; Bacciagaluppi (2002) is a notable exception.21
∙ There is an ongoing (and somewhat sensationalist) discussion in the lit-
erature about so-called “quantum suicide”: the idea that an agent in an
Everettian universe should expect with certainty to survive any process
which third-party observers regard him as having non-zero probability of
surviving. The idea has been around in the physics community for a long
time (see, e. g. , Tegmark (1998); it was first introduced to philosophers by
David Lewis, in his only paper on the Everett interpretation (Lewis 2004a)
and has been discussed further by Lewis (2000) and Papineau (2003).
∙ Everett was originally motivated in part by a desire for an interpretation
of quantum mechanics that was suitable for cosmology in that it did not
assume an external observer. The Everett interpretation has been widely
influential in quantum cosmology ever since: for an introduction, see Har-
tle (2010). It is not universally acknowledged that quantum cosmology
does require the Everett interpretation, though; for dissenting views (from
widely differing perspectives) see Fuchs and Peres (2000), Smolin (1997,
240–266) and Rovelli (2004, pp. 209–222).
∙ The de Broglie-Bohm ‘pilot wave’ theory (aka Bohmian mechanics) has
sometimes been criticised for being “Everett in denial”: that is, being
the Everett interpretation with some additional epiphenomenal structure.
For examples of this criticism, see Deutsch (1996) and Brown and Wallace
(2004); for responses, see Lewis (2007a) and Valentini (2010) (see also
18See, the discussions in e. g. , Bell (1981a) or Maudlin (2002).
19That the dynamics are thereby required to violate Lorentz covariance does not uncontro-
versially follow; cf Myrvold (2002), Wallace and Timpson (2010) and Tumulka (2006).
20For a more detailed analysis — which gives a slightly different account of why the Everett
interpretation is an exception to Bell’s result — see Timpson and Brown (2002).
21Storrs McCall also explores these issues in developing his approach to quantum mechan-
ics (see, e. g. , McCall (2000); that approach is related to, but not identical to, the Everett
interpretation (and, insofar as it relies on an explicit and precise concept of branching with-
out offering a dynamical explication of when branching occurs, arguably fails to solve the
measurement problem.)
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Brown’s (2010) response to Valentini). Allori et al (2008) can also be
read as a response, insofar as it advocates a position on the ontology of
a physical theory far removed from that of section 6 and from which the
Everett-in-denial objection cannot be made.
12 Further reading
Saunders et al (2010) is an up-to-date and edited collection of articles for and
against the Everett interpretation, including contributions from a large frac-
tion of the physicists and philosophers involved in the contemporary debate;
Saunders’ introduction to the book provides an overview of the Everett inter-
pretation complementary to this chapter. Barrett (1999) is a comprehensive
guide to discussions of the Everett interpretation in (mostly) the philosophy of
physics literature, up to the late 1990s. DeWitt and Graham (1973) is a classic
collection of original papers. Wallace (2011) is my own book-length defence
of the Everett interpretation; Wallace (2008) is a review of the measurement
problem more generally, focussed on the role of decoherence theory. Greaves
(2007b) reviews work in the probability problem.
Afterword
I have left undiscussed the often-unspoken, often-felt objection to the Everett
interpretation: that it is simply unbelievable. This is because there is little
to discuss: that a scientific theory is wildly unintuitive is no argument at all
against it, as twentieth century physics proved time and again. David Lewis
is memorably reported to have said that he did not know how to refute an
incredulous stare; had he been less charitable, he might have said explicitly
that an incredulous stare is not an argument, and that if someone says that
they are incapable of believing a given theory — philosophical or scientific —
they are but reporting on their psychology.
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